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PHILIP DEVINE, "THE MORAL BASIS OF
VEGETARIANISM," PHI! OSOPHY 53, pp. 481-505.
Once upon a time, not too long ago (1978),
Philip Devine wrote a fable in which he tried
to undermine two olausible defenses of vege
carianism: the utilitarian, according to
which eating animals is wrong because of the
animal pain required to produce th 7 m7at;
and a position which condemns the k~~hng of
animals because it is killing. Dev~ne con
cluded his fable with a defense of species
ism. In this paper I will first examine
Devine's discussion of utilitarianism as
a basis of vegetarianism, and then turn to
his own defense of species ism. Since I
hope to show that Devine has badly mis
applied utilitarianism, there is no n~ed
to focus on his discussion of the wrongness
of killing.
Devine's primary goal is to undermine
the following utilitarian def 7nse o~ vege
tarianism: "killing and rear~ng an~mals
for food causes more pain than it causes
us pleasure," and so "the practice is for
triat reason morally objectionable" (485).
In criticizing the utilitarian argument
Devine assumes "that animals are capable
of suffering pain, and do in fact suffer
pain in bein~ reared and slaughtered for
food" (485). '" But because "animal exper.
ience is so lacking in intensity that tne
pains of animals are overridden b~ th~
pleasures experienced by huma~ ~e~n~s ,
(491), Devine rejects the ut~l~tar~an s
crucial calculation that "animals suffer
more pain in being killed and reared f~r
food than human beings enjoy pleasure ~n
eating flesh" (485).
Devine offers two reasons for thinking
that animal suffering lacks the requisite
intensity. First, since animals are
"incapable of telling [us] that they. are
in pain, as distinct from (s~y~ moan~n? ..
[this] may well justify ascr~b~ng to tnem
pains of much less intensity than those
we ascribe to human beings" (436). Second,
since humans can intellectualize about pain,
"animal pain is conceptually defective".
and "there seems no good reason to res~st
transposing [this conceptual defectiveness]
into lack of intensity" (486). Devine also
says he can make the same point in a diff
erent way. Since "pain involves elements
both of emotion and sensation ... it is
highly plausible to maintain that non-human
animals--even supposing that they experi
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ence pain as a sensation as intensely as
hUillans do--experience far less suffering"
(486). In short, animal suffering has a
"lesser conceptual richness. A cow may
experience some distress at losing her
calf, but it makes little sense to speak
of her grief" (486).
The inability to talk is not related in
any way to an inability to experience in
tense pain (if that is part of Devine's
argument). Nor would the lack of an
ability to conceptualize, in Devine's
narrow sense of verbalize, show that anim, 'ls
cannot experience emotions. Animals can
perceive, recognize, remember, figure out
how to do things--abilities which are suffi
cient to guarantee that animals will have,
in addition to sensations, emotions,l
unless Devine makes it definitionally true
that to be able to experience an emotion an
entity must be able to verbalize. Such a
reply would, besides begging a crucial
question, conflict with an overwhelming
amount of evidence that animals do exper
ience emotions, including the only one
Devine mentions, grief. 2

Perhaps, of course, Devine has in mind' the
epistemological relationship between the
ability of an animal to talk and our ability
to know whether, or how much, it is suffering.
But if there is a problem about knowing wno
or what besides me experienc~s pain,this
problem will not allow anyone to pretend
that whether, or how much, a creature suffers
is resolved by discovering that it utters
stat~ments like 'It hurts.'
Whatever deep
diffi~ulties may arise in using moans and
writhings as criteria for saying that
another creature suffers will also arise for
using language as such a criterion: that
some creatures can replace a scream of pain
with an utterance using the word 'pain'
alters neither our a~cription of pain nor
our evaluation of its intensity. In
short, Devine provides no good reason for
thinking that animal suffering is less
intense than human suffering.
ihat Devine has not provided good reason
for making light of animal suffering in
comparison to human suffering is a deva
stating comment on ~is view of the utili
tarian justification of vegetarianism. But
no less devastating is his failure to ta~e
the utilitarian defense seriously enough
to check out the human side of the utili
tarian calculation. Even if animal suffering
were less intense than human suffering, the
utilitarian would still need to know whether
there was enough human pleasure derived from
the taste of meat to outweigh the requisite
animal suffering.
The human abilities to verbalize and con
ceptualize often, in fact, prevent us from
appreciating sensations as they present them
selves to us. This fact, the fact of inatten
tion to immediate sensation, suggests t.'lt
humans typically do not enjoy tastes to dny
great intensity, which is the critical
experience on the human siae-of the utili
tarian calculation. On the animal side of
the calculation it is even worse: animals
have no complex conceptual mechanisms to
distract them from the painful sensations
they experience while they are caged, prodded
and slaughtered. It is very dubious, for
example, to think that a family at MacDonald's
experiences so much pleasure from eating
their hamburger in such a distracting en
vironment that this pleasure overcomes even
a fraction of the frustration, pain and
terror that the cow had to undergo in order
wind up on a sesame seed bun.
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This observation may suggest that whatever
pleasures humans experience due to eating
meat is to be compared with whatever suffer
suffering animals undergo. But that is not the
crucial utilitarian calculation. Rather,
the utilitarian is only interested in the
amount of pleasure which would oni~ occur
were we to eat meat and which wou
not
occur were we to eat tasty vegetable-s-
vegetable-s-instead. That is the amount of pleasure
which is a consequence of eating meat
(as opposed to eating in general). Since
much of the world's population finds that
vegetarian meals can be delightfully
tasty, there is good reason for thinking
that the pleasures which people derive
from eating meat can be completely, or
nearly completely, replaced' with pleasures
from eating vegetables. Hence, animal
suffering would have to be so unintense as
to leave the animals nearly indifferent in
order for the utilitarian calculation to
permit the eating of meat. Since this is
false, utilitaraianism prohibits the eating
of meat and provides a solid moral basis for
vegetarianism.
Devine concludes his fable trying to defend
and justify a moral principle for treating
nonhuman animals differently because they
are not humans (498-504). His apology for
species ism is the following: "anthro
"anthropocentricity of some sort cannot be avoided.
Morality is a human phenomenon, and the .
moral words are words in human language"
(504). But Devine overlooks the vast
difference between (1) being a member 1)f
the human species, and so being unable to
avoid using human language; and (2) bei.ng
a human speciesist, and so using human
language to attempt to justify treating
nonhumans differently simply because they
are nonhumans. Although it is true that
we cannot help being members of the human
species, we can stop being speciesists,
and carefully evaluating the relevant
arguments may help.
Like many fables, Devine's fable about
ethics and animals provides us with a moral:
being philosophical about animals involves
more than just rationalizing a set of con
conventional beliefs, whereas acting morally
toward animals, at least if one is a
utilitarian, involves being a vegetarian.
Bart Gruzalski
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lOne could maintain that having an emotion
requires making an assessment which is (a)
conceptual in nature and (b) beyond the
scope of animals. But, as William Alston
points out, (a) is highly controversial,
and to assume such a view as true would be
to beg a highly controversial question in
the philosophy of mind (see "Emotions and
Feelings," Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967),
pp. 479-486). But even if (a) were true,
to assume, in addition, that (b) is true
would be to bet a central question about
animals.
2For such evidence see In the Shadow of llan
(1971), Jane van Lawick-Goodall, pp. 225
225229; Amon~ the Elephants (1975), lain and
Oria Doug as-Hamilton; and The Lure of the
Dolphins (1979); pp. 144-14) and 24-26.

